The Legalization of Blackmail:
A Reply to Professor Gordon
Walter Block*

Blackmail is the offer to refrain from engaging in an act that one
has the right to perform.' Typically, the licit act from which the
blackmailer is offering to refrain is the exercise of his rights of free

speech. Alternatively, the blackmailee can initiate this agreement; he
may approach the blackmailer with the offer of money or other
valuable consideration as the price for the blackmailer's silence. In a
1993 article, Wendy J. Gordon hypothesized that blackmail's "central
case" occurs when the blackmailer is in possession of information

embarrassing or harmful to the blackmailee, and for a fee refrains
from publicizing that information.2 The present Article responds to
Gordon's assertion that, for various reasons, blackmail should be
legally prohibited.
4
A blackmail 3 contract would be legal in a libertarian society.
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Walter Block & Christopher E. Kent, Blackmail in MAGILL'S LEGAL GUIDE, 109

(1999). Alternatively, blackmail is the threat to engage in a licit act, unless paid off
not to do so.
2 See Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's
Central
Case, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1741, 1746 (1993).

3 It is difficult to overestimate the importance that blackmail plays in the
political economy of our society. It pervades every nook and cranny. For example,
Newsweek states, "[Bill] Gates cogently answered questions ...,while in Washington,
Attorney General Janet Reno and the head of her antitrust division, Joel Klein, were
charging Microsoft with playing a game of anticompetitive blackmail to force
computer manufacturers to favor its Internet browsing program." Steven Levy,
Breaking Windows, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1997, at 46. There is no reason to couch
antitrust issues in blackmail terminology; intellectually, one topic is quite a stretch
from the other. That this is done in a popular magazine, however, is evidence of
how deeply embedded the concept of blackmail is in our everyday thinking.

4 See generally WALTER BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE 44-49
(1976)
[hereinafter BLOCK, UNDEFENDABLE]; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF IBERTY
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Libertarianism is that an individual may do anything he wishes with
his person and his justly acquired property, provided that he does not
interfere with the identical rights of any other person. Free speech
(as long as it occurs on one's own property) is a protected activity,
and a man can expose another's secrets without invading the other's
person or his property. In a libertarian society, someone could also
refrain, for consideration, from revealing information about another.
In such situations, the individuals would enter into a mutually agreed
upon contract. The blackmailer would benefit because he values the
money he receives more than the costs to him of the silence he must
maintain. The blackmailee also would gain because he ranks the
confidentiality he attains higher than the money he pays for it. Were
both parties not to experience this mutual gain, the agreement would
not take place.
I. THE NONEXISTENT PARADOX

In contrast to this position, and despite the mutual gains and
consent on both sides, Gordon maintains that blackmail should be
legally prohibited. 6 In taking this stance, Gordon begins her
argument by stating that "criminalizing blackmail involves neither a
paradox nor a contradiction, notwithstanding the fact that blackmail
law prohibits offers to sell discreditable information that the law
would permit the seller to disclose without penalty."7 This statement,
however, is a paradox because it acknowledges that people are
124-26, 245-49 (1982) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, ETHICS]; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN,
ECONOMY AND STATE 443 n.49 (1993) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, ECONOMY AND STATE];
Walter Block, Trading Money for Silence, 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 57 (1986); Walter Block,
The Casefor De-CriminalizingBlackmail: A Reply to Lindgren and Campbell, 24 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 225 (1997) [hereinafter Block, De-Criminalizing]; Walter Block & David
Gordon, Blackmail Extortion and Free Speech Rights: A Reply to Posner,Epstein, Nozick and
Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 37 (1985) [hereinafter Block & Gordon, Blackmai
Extortion]; Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHILOSOPHICAL STUD. 273, 273-4

(1982).

See generally BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE
STATE (1990); DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER (1997); HANS-HERMANN HOPPE,
5

THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:

STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND

PHILOSOPHY (1993) (hereinafter HOPPE, PRIVATE PROPERTY]; TIBOR MACHAN,
INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR RIGHTS (1989); CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A
LIBERTARIAN (1997); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY (1973) [hereinafter
ROTHBARD, NEW LIBERTY]; ROTHBARD, ETHICS, supra note 4; Bruce L. Benson,

Enforcement of PrivateProperty Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without Government, 9J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 (1989); Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial
Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989); Tibor Machan, Law, Justice and Natural Rights, 14 W.
ONTARIO L. REv. 119 (1975).
6 See Gordon, supranote 2, at
1784-85.
7

Id at 1741.
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incarcerated merely for doing what they have a right to do. Gordon
demurs on this point by stating that "[i]f people do not invariably
have a right to threaten to do or not do the things they are at liberty
to do or not do, then blackmail's illegality is perfectly consistent with
the larger pattern.
Hence, the statement does not produce a
paradox."8 In this Gordon is mistaken; people most certainly have
the right to threaten (or to offer) to do that which they have a right
to do. Were this not the case, an individual would have the right to
engage in an act, but would not be able to tell anyone about it, to
publicize it, to offer or to threaten to do it, or to in any way indulge
his free speech rights about it.
To buttress her point, Gordon cites the doctrine of
"unconstitutional conditions," which "holds that even though the
government may withhold a benefit entirely, it can nevertheless be
prohibited from offering the benefit on the condition that the
recipient forgo a constitutional right."9 ' Why, though, should what
the government may or may not do serve as the basis for law? From
the libertarian perspective, the United States government itself is a
lawless institution in violation of the libertarian legal code because it
necessarily initiates violence against nonaggressors (for example,
those who are forced to pay taxes against their will and those who are
prevented from patronizing alternative defense agencies).'0
Gordon's contention, however, is problematic even apart from
this consideration.
Even supposing that the government is a
8

Id at 1743.

Id. at 1743 n.19 (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989)).

10 See generally ROTHBARD, ETHICS, supra note 4, at 159-88 (articulating the
libertarian philosophy as applied to government); ROTHBARD, NEW LIBERTY, supra
note 5, at 45-69 (exploring the private provision of all government services); MURRAY
N.

ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET:

GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY

10-23, 203-55

(1970) (positing that taxes are an illegitimate government action) [hereinafter
ROTHBARD, POWER];

LYSANDER SPOONER, No TREASON:

THE CONSTITUTION OF No

AUTHORrrY (1870) (arguing that the United States Constitution is not a binding
contract upon its citizens); MORRIS TANNENHILL & LINDA TANNENHILL, THE MARKET

FOR LIBERTY (1984) (explaining how the market can supplant the government in
providing for public goods); WILLIAM C. WOOLRIDGE, UNCLE SAM, THE MONOPOLY
MAN (1970) (explaining how the market can supplant the government in providing
for public goods); Randy E. Barnett, Whither Anarchy? Has Robert Nozick Justified the

State, I J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 15 (1977) (articulating Robert Nozick's failure to show
the deficiencies of libertarian anarchism); Roy A. Childs, Jr., The Invisible Hand Strikes
Back, 1J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 23 (1977); Williamson M. Evers, Toward a Reformulation of
the Law of Contracts, I J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 3 (1977); Murray N. Rothbard, Robert
Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State, 1J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 45 (1977);John
T. Sanders, The Free Market Model versus Government: A Reply to Nozick, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN

STUD. 35 (1977).
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legitimate institution, basing blackmail law on the fact that the
government can "be prohibited from offering [a] benefit on the
condition that the recipient forgo a constitutional right"" amounts to
legal positivism. The government, conceivably, could have taken the
opposite tack by allowing itself to offer a "benefit on the condition
that the recipient forgo a constitutional right."12 If that had been the
case, Gordon would not have been forced to concede the case for
blackmail legalization because, in fact, no implications for blackmail
logically flow from the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Gordon relies on several other considerations in coming to the
conclusion that the right to act does not imply a right to notify. For
example, Gordon states:
Threatening to disclose induces action in a way that disclosure
does not, so that doing and threatening can have quite different
effects. This occurs in part because the two acts affect different
parties: any threat the blackmailer makes will be directed to the
person with the embarrassing secret, but any disclosure will be to
third parties.""
It is irrelevant, however, that the threat of action may focus on
one set of people, while the actual action may focus on another. The
real issue is whether any of these acts or threats to act constitute an
uninvited border-crossing contrary to the libertarian code. Because
none of them do, all should be decriminalized, notwithstanding the
undoubted distinction between acts and threats to act.
Gordon also supports her position that blackmail should be
illegal by stating:
[T] he blackmailer does more than merely threaten: He threatens
to disclose unless money is paid. Regardless of whether we have
liberty to threaten, the law often forbids us to commodify our
liberties by selling them. Our liberties to make sexual use of our
bodies cannot be bartered for cash in most states; our right to
vote can neither be transferred gratuitously nor sold. The
growing literature on inalienability makes clear that doing and
selling are quite different issues."
The first of these allegations is no more than another instance of
legal positivism. Propriety in the law consists of precisely what the
legislature mandates, no more and no less. Gordon's argument
implies that the law forbids individuals from selling or
" Gordon, supra note 2, at 1743 n.19 (citing Sullivan, supranote 9, at 1415).
12 Id.
'3 Id. at 1744.
14 Id.
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commodifying 5 their liberties, and that is the end of the matter. This
is an untenable argument because the law can often be mistaken, and
what the law says at any particular time or place often gives little
indication of what the law should be. Moreover, Gordon's argument

is particularly troubling for reasons beyond its legal positivism
approach. Gordon implicitly concedes that in some states individuals
are at liberty to trade sexual services for cash; she states that the law
"often" (but not always) "forbids us to commodify" and that
prostitution is forbidden only in "most" (but not all) states. (If so, this
example certainly cannot be used to prove her point regarding the
illegality of blackmail.)
According to Gordon's logic, blackmail
should be legalized in some states but not in others.
Gordon also erroneously relies on the prohibition of the transfer
of one's right to vote. Vote buying is prohibited not because there is
anything intrinsically wrong with such a state of affairs, but rather
because, by stipulation,"6 individuals have agreed to live under such
institutional rules.
If consent is the basis for this prohibition,
however, society could just as easily have consented to do the very
opposite.
Gordon further argues, citing an article by James Lindgren for
support, that "if an unfaithful husband pays hush money to conceal
his infidelity, the blackmailer is receiving compensation while the
affected wife receives neither information nor compensation."'" This
15 For a libertarian analysis of commodification,
see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 331 n.48 (1974); Walter Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of

Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Epstein and Kinsella, J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. (forthcoming); Walter Block, Market Inalienability Once Again:
Reply to Radin, 22 T.JEFFERSON L.J. 37-88 (1999).
That this stipulation is a heroic one can be seen in the following statement:
[T] he state has been living on a revenue which was being produced in
the private sphere for private purposes and had to be deflected from
these purposes by political force. The theory which construes taxes on
the analogy of club dues or of the purchase of the services of, say, a
doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is
from scientific habits of mind.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 198 & n. 11 (1942).

17 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1744-45 n.24
(citing James Lindgren, Unraveling the
Paradox ofBlackmail 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670 (1984) [hereinafter Lindgren, Paradox]).
For Lindgren's contribution to the debate, see generally James Lindgren, BlackmailAn Afterward, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1975 (1993);James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste,
Morals and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REv. 597 (1989);James Lindgren, In Defense of
Keeping Blackmail a Crime: Responding to Block and Gordon, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 35
(1986);James Lindgren, Kept in the Dark: Owen's View of Blackmai4 21 CONN. L. REv.
749 (1989);James Lindgren, More Blackmail Ink: A Critique of Blackmail, Inc., Epstein's
Theoy of Blackmai4 16 CONN. L. REV. 909 (1984); James Lindgren, Secret Rights: A
Comment on Campbell's Theory of Blackmai 21 CONN. L. REV. 407 (1989); James
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How can this
statement, however, begs the question:
"information... properly belong.., to third parties?" 8 Before any
commercial interaction takes place, only two people own the
information:
the blackmailer and the unfaithful husband, the
possible future blackmailee. The husband may well owe his wife full
disclosure, due to his marriage vows, 9 but the blackmailer, a total
stranger, certainly does not owe anything to this unfortunate woman.
20
While Gordon characterizes the spurned wife as the "primary party,
she has no claim against the blackmailer no matter how unfairly her
spouse has treated her. To support her argument, Gordon relies on
Edward J. Bloustein, who in a 1964 article stated that "'[i]n a
community at all sensitive to the commercialization of human values,
it is degrading to thus make a man part of commerce against his
will.'

2

'

This, however, is a misreading because no one is being forced

to do anything against his will. Consider the possibility that the
husband, learning that someone is about to reveal his secret, initiates
the blackmail offer by approaching the blackmailer and offering him
money in exchange for silence. This may amount to
"commodification," but it is not coercive to the husband. On the
contrary, the husband initiatedthe transaction.
2
Gordon also cites articles by George Daly and J. Fred Giertz,
Ronald H. Coase," Douglas H. Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman,24 and
Richard A. Epstein25 to support her argument that performing an act
Lindgren, The Theory, History and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1695 (1993); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 670 (1984).
For criticism of Lindgren, see generally Block & Gordon,
Blackmail, Extortion, supra note 4; Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the
Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1663 (1993); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul
Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1849
(1993);Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmailfrom A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905 (1993).
Lindgren, Paradox,supra note 17, at 702.
'q If the state were to separate itself from this essentially private institution, and
people signed voluntary marriage contracts providing for faithfulness, then and only
then would this be true. At present, whether any such conclusion may be drawn is
unclear at best.
20
See Gordon, supranote 2, at 1745.
21 Id. at 1745 (quoting EdwardJ. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 988 (1964)).
Z See id. at 1745 n.25 (citing George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities,Extortion,
and Efficiency: Reply, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 736, 997, 999-1001 (1975)).
23 See id. at 1745 n.26 (citing Ronald Coase, The 1987 McCorkle
Lecture: Blackmail,
74 VA. L. REV. 655, 671-74 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, McCorkle]).
24 See id. at 1745 n.27 (citing Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 17,
at 1865
(1993)).
23
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1745 n.28 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Blackmai4
Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 561-65 (1983)). For a critique of the Epstein article, see
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and threatening to perform an act can have quite different economic
impacts. Despite this support, Gordon's point is far from proven
because the argument is irrelevant to the legality of blackmail.
Threats or offers are legitimate to the extent that the underlying
action is (or should be) legal. An individual may properly threaten to
gossip about another person's secret unless paid because the
underlying free speech is legitimately protected by law. That same
individual, however, may not threaten to murder or to kidnap unless
compensated because those acts are rightfully proscribed.
II. THE CENTRAL CASE OF BLACKMAIL
Gordon introduces the model of "central case blackmail" to
show that both the economic wealth maximization and the
deontological moral theoretical schools of thought26 argue that
blackmail should be prohibited by law.17 Gordon explains that the

central case" occurs
where the blackmailer acquires information for the sole purpose
of obtaining money or other advantage from the victim, and
where he has no intent or desire to publish the information,
except as an instrument toward this purpose. The blackmailer's
sole claim to this advantage rests on his possession of the
information as leverage28

In Gordon's view, this model, in one form or another, underlies
the opposition to blackmail legalization espoused in the writings of
Robert Nozick,6 Kent Greenawalt," Epstein, Coase , and Ginsburg

generally Walter Block, Blackmail from A to Z: A Reply to Joseph Isenbergh's "Blackmail
from A to C, "50 MERCER L. REv. 569 (1999).
The economic wealth maximization school of thought defines proper law
as
that which will lead to the greatest amount of wealth possible. A chief proponent of
this viewpoint is Richard A. Posner. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ANALYSIS].
Deontological
schools of thought define proper law in terms of an underlying philosophical
background. For example, a religious deontological school might define it in terms
of adhering to biblical requirements. A libertarian one would define proper law as
that which promotes, or is in keeping with, private rights and the nonaggression
axiom. See generally ROTHBARD, ETHICS, supra note 4; HOPPE, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra
note 5.
27 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1746.
28 See id. at 1746.
29 See id. at 1746-47 & n.37 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
84-86 (1974) [hereinafter NOziCK, ANARCHY]).
so See id. at 1747 & n.42 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Feedom of
Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1099 (1983)).
See id. (citing Epstein, supra note 25, at 561-66).
See id. at 1747-48 (citing Coase, McCorkle, supra note 23, at 674).
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and Shechtman.3s This may well be true, at least in part. All of these
authors mistakenly favor prohibitionism and may have been guided,
at least to some degree, by the considerations Gordon brings to the
fore. This concern with mere motives, however, is problematic. The
purposes and intentions of the blackmailer should not play any role
in the determination of the legal status of blackmail, let alone the
central one that Gordon assigns to them. It is said that if bad
intentions were enough to violate the criminal law, we would all be in
jail. A similar point needs to be made on behalf of the blackmailer.
Moreover, even if Gordon somehow proves her point with
regard to "central case" blackmail, this cannot be used to legally
proscribe such acts. For all the blackmailer need maintain in his
defense is that he is not a "central case blackmailer." Rather, he
derives a psychic benefit from releasing the information, whether out
of a sense of justice (for example, punishing the philandering
husband) or out of a desire to establish himself as a professional
blackmailer with a reputation for divulging information when not
paid off. In neither of these cases can the unique Gordon
contribution to this debate be used against such a defendant.
III. A CONSEQUENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE
A. The Economic Argument
Gordon quite correctly distinguishes between "harmful acts
[people] are free to perform,"34 and those which, presumably, they
are not legally free to conduct. To illustrate this, the author states:
For example, a person who decides not to build a sun-blocking
fence out of consideration for his sun-loving neighbor cannot sue
to obtain a reward for his forbearance. He can choose, however,
to negotiate over the fence's height, and demand consideration
5
from his neighbor in exchange for keeping the fence low.

How does blackmail fit into all of this? This act is in one sense
"harmful" to the blackmailee, who would prefer that the blackmailer
had never learned of his secret. On the other hand, given that his
past has been uncovered, the blackmailee would vastly prefer that a
blackmailer, not the inveterate gossip, discover the information. By
definition, the gossip will broadcast all the information at his

See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1747-48 (citing Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note
17, at 1859).
3
Id. at 1748.
SId. at

1748-49 n. 50.
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disposal. The blackmailer, in contrast, provides at least the chance of
a mutually agreeable deal. If the blackmailer places a low enough
value on his service of silence, and the blackmailee a high enough
value on his secret, then a deal can be struck that benefits both
parties, at least in the ex ante sense.36
Regardless of whether blackmail is harmful, revealing another's
secret is an act that an individual is free to perform. No one suggests
that the gossip should be incarcerated. But if one may legitimately
speak, then one may also keep silent. If one has the right to keep
silent, then one may be paid for keeping silent. Because blackmail
consists of no more than being paid for remaining silent, Gordon
logically should be compelled to favor its legalization.
Gordon evades this conclusion by referring to the notion that
"[t] he blackmailer does not wish to disclose, only to extract a transfer
payment.,3

7

Gordon rejects legalization because she defines "central

case blackmail" so as to preclude from consideration those who are
motivated by profits, not free speech. Motive, however, seems to be
a weak reed upon which to hang an entire theory of criminal
behavior. For in Gordon's view, two people can act in an identical
manner, yet one will be guilty of a crime and the other will be totally
innocent of it. The first, call him the "speech blackmailer," wishes,
initially, to disclose the blackmailee's secret, but is only dissuaded
from making a revelation by payment for his silence. The second,
call him the "profit-seeking blackmailer," has no real independent
interest in exposing the history of the blackmailee; he is solely
interested in receiving money. The profit-seeking blackmailer,
however, asks for or accepts a payment to keep silent just as the
speech blackmailer does, perhaps even an identical amount. Yet,
merely because of these different intentions, Gordon condemns the
one as a criminal, yet not the other. Motive is often used to
determine degree of guilt; here, remarkably, motive is being used to
discern presence or absence of guilt. This is too great a weight to
place on so frail a foundation. 9

.%BLOCK, UNDEFENDABLE, supra note 4, at
44-49.

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1749.
M See id.
I" Even Gordon herself states that "[miotive is a notoriously difficult basis
on
which to build fundamental legal distinctions." Id. at 1771.
17
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B. The Irrelevance of Lawful or Beneficial Nature of the Threatened
Action
For many scholars, the prohibition of blackmail is paradoxical:
Two distinct acts are legal when taken separately, but are illegal when
taken together.40 Those individuals admit that the first act-making a
threat, or an offer, or giving a warning that you will speak-as well as
the second act-asking for or accepting money-are both licit. They
assert, however, that when combined into one single act, the two
together should be prohibited by law.

Peter Alldridge, Attempted Murder of the Soul: Blackmail, Privacy and Secrets, 13
OXFORDJ. L. STUD. 368-87; Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 1639-61 (1993); Gary Becker, The Case Against Blackmail, January, 1985
(unpublished); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413-1540 (1992); Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935-73 (1993); Debra J.
Campbell, Why Blackmail Should Be Criminalized: A Reply to Walter Block and David
Gordon, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 883-92 (1988); A. H. Campbell, The Anomalies of
Blackmai4 55 L. Q. REv. 382 (1939); Daly & Giertz, supra note 21; Sidney W. DeLong,
Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1663-93 (1993);
Daniel Ellsberg, The Theory and Practiceof Blackmail, in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES
OF NEGOTIATION 343 (Oran R. Young, ed., 1975); Epstein, supra note 25; Hugh Evans,
Why Blackmail Should Be Banned, 65 PHILOSOPHY 89-94 (1990); JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1990); Joel Feinberg,
The Paradox of Blackmail, 1 RATIOJURIS83 (1988); George P. Flectcher, Blackmail: The
ParadigmaticCase, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617-38 (1993); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 17; Arthur L. Goodhart,
PROMISE (1981);
Blackmail and Consideration in Contracts, 44 LEGAL Q. REv. 436 (1928), reprinted in
ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 175 (1931);
Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 43-66
(1992); Michael Gorr, Nozick's Arguments Against Blackmai4 58 PERSONALIST 187, 190
(1977); Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals, POL. THEORY 65-79 (1976); Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining,Duress and Economic Liability, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603-28 (1943); Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470
(1923); Russell Hardin, Blackmailingfor Mutual Goods, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1787-1815
(1993); MICHAEL HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICrIY AND SECRECY INEVERYDAY LIFE 2940 (1975); Isenbergh, supra note 17; R. S.Jandoo & W. Arthur Harland, Legally Aided
Blackmai4 27 NEW L.J. 402-04 (1984); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm
Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1567-1615 (1993); William Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 43 (1975); Lindgren, supra note 17;
Daniel Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, PHILOSOPHY 425-36 (1975); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156 (1980); Nozick, supra note
29; David Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHILOSOPHY 501-14 (1979); Richard
Posner, Blackmail, Privacy and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1817-47 (1993);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, (3d ed. 1986); Steven Shavell, An
Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Legality: Blackmail, Extortion and Robbey, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1877-1903 (1993); L. G. Tooher, Developments in the Law of Blackmail in
England and Australia,27 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 337 (1978);Jeremy Waldron, Blackmail
as Complicity (Nov. 1992) (unpublished); W. H. D. Winder, The Development of
Blackmai 5 MODERN L. REv. 21, 36-41 (1941).
40
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Gordon, in contrast to both of these views, takes a third, distinct
position. Gordon describes her view as follows:
The initial "paradox" involved the fact that the blackmailer
threatened to do an act that was itself lawful and, by implication,
beneficial. The foregoing discussion should make clear that the
beneficial or harmful nature of the action threatened is irrelevant
to the core economic argument against central case blackmail. In
central case blackmail, the threatened action has no independent
positive value for either party. What motivates the bargain instead
is that the action will have a negative value to the person
threatened that is greater than the null or negative value it has for
the threatener. In such a context, it is in no one's interest for the
threat of disclosure to be carried out.4'
Gordon's first error is that she equates "lawful" with "beneficial."
Although the first term simply does not imply the second, Gordon
slides smoothly from the one to the other, failing to recognize that
the two are neither identical nor deducible from one another. There
are many lawful acts that should not be considered beneficial, such as
pornography, gambling, prostitution, and consuming unhealthy
foods. An act need not be beneficial for it to be legal.42
Gordon, however, does have a response to this criticism:
Note that the distinction here addresses the beneficial nature of
the threatened action and does not separately consider its
lawfulness. That is because I am assuming that in assessing the
"blackmail paradox," the lawfulness of disclosure would have
meaning for the economist merely as an indirect indicator that
disclosure yielded more benefits than costs.
The analysis would be more complex if we were to take into
account the possibility that any criminalization of a threat to do a
lawful act would itself have negative consequences. For example,

such criminalization may cause confusion or erode respect for the
law.

I give no attention to these possibilities since I think the

criminalizing central case blackmail has no such consequences,
largely because the person on the street perceives blackmail to be

a wrong; therefore, criminalization of the activity evokes no sense
of inconsistency.43
Gordon is undoubtedly correct about "the person on the street."
Moreover, it is not just this presumably ignorant man who sees no
41
42

Gordon, supranote 2, at 1750-51.
Of course, acts such as pornography and fatty food consumption are beneficial

in at least some sense; in both instances, the products were purchased by willing

buyers. The purchasers of these items must have perceived some value in them.
43 See id. at 1750 n.55.

2000]

BLACKMAIL

1193

logical inconsistency in "any criminalization of a threat to do a lawful
act." Judging from the writers who favor the status quo prohibition of
blackmail," one might well conclude that the mainstream professor
in the law school or in the economics department also fails to see the
paradox of blackmail prohibition. This paradox most certainly does
"erode respect for the law" on the part of those, such as this Author
and a small band of commentators,5 who have long been protesting
this perversion of the law. Indeed, one of the primary motivating
forces in writing this reply is to protest that this injustice is based on a
sense of inconsistency. That this should be dismissed on the grounds
that the masses of people on the street or in the professorate seem to
have missed the point sets a new and very remarkable standard for
analysis in social science. After all, had you asked most people, even
most scientists at one time, they would have replied that yes, the
Earth is flat and the Sun revolves around it. Happily, these
sentiments were not taken as bedrock upon which further analysis
rested.
In any case, the fact that the "man on the street" has the views he
does with regard to criminalizing threats to engage in legal activities is
due in no small part to the efforts of Gordon and her colleagues, who
have striven mightily to convince him of this very erroneous point. It
comes, then, with particular ill grace, and with more than a whiff of
circularity, for Gordon to now turn around and rely on the
unprofessional opinions of the common man to support her own
views. She and her colleagues played a great role in causing them in
the first place.
Error number two is that Gordon's screed against legalization
depends utterly on her assumption that the blackmailer derives not
one iota of pleasure out of releasing the secret, in those cases in
which the blackmailee refused to pay. Who among us, were he to
enter into this ancient profession in the first place, would act in so
cold-blooded a manner? Surely, it is part and parcel of the human
condition to lash out at those who balk us. So, as a matter of realism,
it may fairly be charged that Gordon's central case blackmailer is a
null set.* Gordon is correct in stating that the leverage value
obtained by the blackmailer who carries through on his threat when
44 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (listing several articles advocating
the
prohibition of blackmail).
45 See supra note
4.

46

On the other hand, this extreme case, it cannot be denied, performs a useful

heuristic function, much akin to that of the perfect gas, the frictionless system in
physics, and equilibrium in economics.
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not paid, so as to make further threats more credible, "is thus not an
independent positive value to the single-instance, central-case
blackmailer."47 But she seems oblivious to the possibility that there
has never been and is now no such person.
Gordon, in support of her argument, cites Daly and Giertz, who
state that "the key feature of extortion is the use of a threat to elicit a
payment, not whether the threatened action is legal or illegal."48
Gordon's argument is not strengthened by equating blackmail and
extortion. Such an equation is problematic because the legality or
illegality of the threatened act is crucially important in determining
whether extortion has occurred. For example, suppose a boss
threatens an employee with dismissal unless he comes in to work on
time,49 or a girl threatens a boy that she will not date him unless he
takes her to a movie, or a buyer threatens a seller that he'll take his
business elsewhere unless the price is lowered. Surely all these
threatened acts are themselves legal, and, so, perforce, is the act of
making these threats. In very sharp contrast indeed are demands for
money or other valuable considerations coupled with threats to
murder, maim, or rape.
C. Caveat
In making her argument, Gordon quite reasonably supports the
view of William Landes and Richard A. Posner that blackmail may
make a positive social contribution because the "fear of having to
make blackmail payments may induce potential nonconformists to
conform their behavior to majority standards."' s However, Gordon
then attempts to escape from the implications of this insight with the
contention that blackmail
will impose transaction costs that could well outweigh any
beneficial disclosure resulting from blackmail attempts that
misfire. Further, the possible allocative effect resulting from
occasional disclosure or deterrence is not guaranteed to be
beneficial. Disclosure may have a social value that is positive (for
47

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1751 n.56.
See id. at 1751 n.60 (citing Daly & Giertz, supra note 22, at 757 n.2. Gordon

asserts that, despite the fact that Daly and Giertz, in their article, address extortion by
threat of violence, their model "describes the supply and demand structure of central
case blackmail." Id.
49

See Fletcher, supra note 40, at 1619 (outlining a series of examples in which

one individual can legally threaten to do an act unless another individual performs
or refrains from performing an action).
Gordon, supa note 2, at 1752 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 42-
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example, disclosing to the electorate that a mayor has embezzled
funds) or negative (for example, making public a secret of no
public import that causes deep distress in the family concerned,
such as the fact that when the mayor was a child he was sexually
abused by a relative). It is similarly possible that blackmailinduced conformity might involve a net cost to society.5'
According to what she characterizes as the deontological perspective,
Gordon maintains that blackmail is "unjustifiably hurting others,"
and thus should be declared illegal.52 The blackmailer, however, does
not hurt the blackmailee. On the contrary, the blackmailer is the
benefactor of the blackmailee, in that he has the power to release
embarrassing information, but forebears from doing so. Although
the blackmailer does charge a fee for his services, in the view of the
blackmailee, this price is lower than the possible harm of disclosure, a
fact evidenced by the blackmailee's willingness to pay.
If there is any doubt of this, compare the case of the blackmailer
with that of the gossip. If a gossip uncovers an individual's secret, the
information will necessarily become public because, regardless of the
value the person places on his privacy, the gossip's silence cannot be
bought. When a blackmailer discovers an individual's secret, on the
other hand, there is at least some chance that a bargain can be struck
to ensure the blackmailer's silence. Because no one advocates jailing
gossips, it is difficult to see why Gordon and her colleagues advocate
this fate for blackmailers.
A second flaw in Gordon's argument that blackmail's unjustified
harm to others requires its illegality is that the argument assumes that
a person who unjustifiably hurts another always should be
incarcerated. This, however, is not necessarily so, at least according
to the libertarian philosophy, which reserves penal sentences for
violations of the person or of property rights. For example, consider
a situation in which a wife divorces her husband, not for any fault of
his, but merely because she finds a more attractive younger man.
The wife's action is gratuitous and, therefore, will presumably cause
some degree of unjustified harm to the husband. If Gordon's dicta
were taken literally, the wife would have to be incarcerated because
her action reasonably could be expected to hurt the husband.
Gordon's assertion that the benefits of blackmail are outweighed
by its transaction costs53 is weakened by the fact that virtually any act

51

Id. at 1752-53.

Id. at 1752 n.62.
53 See id. at 1752.
52
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The real issue is not whether

transaction costs exist, or whether they are imposed upon other
people (they often are, as in the cases of the divorce), but instead
whether the blackmailer has a right to engage in the blackmailing
activities. There are two utilitarian approaches to answering this
question. 55 The first, called the "macro" viewpoint, has been adopted
by Gordon and her peers who believe "market failure- 56 to be
overwhelmingly prevalent. The proponents of this approach ask
themselves, from their own subjective perspective, which is stronger:
the harm caused by the blackmail or the benefits caused by the
blackmail. And, since they cordially hate blackmail, they deem it of
lesser value (on the rare occasions they consider it valuable at all)
than attendant costs.
The second approach, call it the "micro" viewpoint, accepts the
ex ante evaluations of the economic actors as definitive.
For
example, if a person buys a coat for $100, there are considerable
transactions costs associated.
The proponent of the "micro"
viewpoint, however, will conclude that the benefits of this transaction
outweigh its total costs, at least in the ex ante sense, because
otherwise the deal would not have been consummated.
In the
context of blackmail, the "micro" viewpoint reasons that the
blackmailee would not have paid the blackmailer had he not
regarded the latter's silence as greater in value than the priceincluding its attendant transaction costs--of that silence. On the
strength of this consideration alone, the "micro" evaluator, such as

Gordon's assertion also begs the question: Why single out transactions costs?
Most acts are costly in terms of land, labor, time, capital, and interest, to say nothing
of opportunity costs.
In light of these varied expenses, Gordon's focus on
transaction costs in this context seems arbitrary.
55 The reasons one would want to adopt utilitarianism is another matter
altogether. For a critique, see generally HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, PRAXEOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1988); ROTHBARD, POWER, supra note 10.
. There is a mischievous and misbegotten thesis popular among mainstream
socialist economists to the effect that the market is subject to all sorts of "market
failures." This thesis is essentially those authors' contention that, compared to some
arbitrary standard, real-world functioning markets come off second best. For
example, the market is not perfectly competitive, and, therefore, it suffers the market
failure of monopoly. Also, some people benefit from the actions of others without
being charged for those benefits; that is the "market failure" of external economies.
See generally HOPPE, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 5; THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed. 1988); DonaldJ. Boudreaux & ThomasJ.
DiLorenzo, The Protectionist Roots of Antitrust, 6 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 81 (1992);
Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Natural Monopoly, 9 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 43
(1997); Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REv. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 1 (1997).
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the economist, determines that blackmail, as with all other "capitalist
acts between consenting adults, 5

7

promotes social welfare. 58

Gordon also becomes enmeshed in a defense of "harmless
behavior that happens to be nonconforming," such as same-gender
sexual relations. 9 The author does not employ this discussion to
support a simple straightforward libertarian defense; since this is
consensual adult behavior, a victimless crime as it were, with no
initiation of violence against nonaggressors, it is a very paradigm case
of legally permitted activity. This realization strikes far too close to
home for Gordon because, had she relied upon this perspective, it
would be a short step indeed to the conclusion that the blackmailerblackmailee relationship, too, is a willing one on both sides.
Instead, Gordon resorts to a utilitarian analysis° 0-doomed at the
6
start due to the illegitimacy of interpersonal comparisons of utility -

in an attempt to show that legalized blackmail would have an
unjustified adverse effect upon homosexuality.6 2 The author could
have utilized the "micro" approach: gay relationships promote utility
in the ex ante sense, evidenced by the fact that, otherwise, at least
one of the partners would terminate, or refuse to even enter into, the
NOZICK, ANARCHY,

supra note 29, at 163.
If people voluntarily agree to any deal, the presumption is that they both gain
from it, at least in the ex ante sense of anticipations. For example, ifone individual
agrees to trade his pen to a second individual for that individual's tie, it must be
because the first individual values the tie more. Likewise, for the transaction to take
place, the second individual must make the opposite evaluation. For an elaboration
of this point, see generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION OF
UTILITY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS 21 (Center for Libertarian Studies, Occasional
Paper Series No. 3,1977) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, UTILITYAND ECONOMICS].
59 Gordon, supranote 2, at 1753
n.64.
60 Utilitarianism is the philosophy most closely associated with Jeremy
Bentham
and John Stuart Mill. It is the view that the good, or the ethical, choice consists of
the one that provides the greatest good for the greatest number of people, thus
maximizing total utility. One obstacle that this view founders on is that it is
impossible to meaningfully measure, and thus compare, the utility of different
people. Unless utility is measurable, however, and additive, maximization is
impossible. Another great difficulty is that the approach is contrary to justice.
Suppose, for example, it could be shown that the Nazis gained more utility from the
torture and murder ofJews than the latter lost from this process. This would hardly
be just, even though it would maximize utility, and thus, seemingly, be advocated by
utilitarians. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM: WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS,
57

(Samuel Gorowitz, ed., 1971).
" See ROTHBARD, UTILITY AND ECONOMICS, Supra note 58, at 21.

Rothbard argues
that, while there are valid measurements for such things as weight, height, speed,
acceleration, and temperature, there is no such thing as a unit of happiness.
Therefore, while it is reasonable to say that x is twice the weight of y, it is an act of
economic illiteracy to claim that x is twice as happy as y.
"' See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1753 n.64.
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relationship. The objections of the more conservative63 have no
standing under this analysis" because they have no means of
"demonstrating their preferences" 65 against such relationships.
Gordon, however, could not tread down this path, for in order to do
so, she would have had to jettison the concept of "negative
externalities."6 ' Much beloved of the "market failure set," Gordon
calls same-gender sexual relationships "harmless." But what about
AIDS, which initially was most prevalent among homosexuals,
continues heavily in those circles, and has devastated, as well,
members of the larger community? Based on this consideration
alone, a utilitarian case could be made that our society does not make
such nonconforming behavior "too expensive," 67 but rather too
cheap.
Then there is an intractable problem: Given that much of the
general public disapproves of the gay lifestyle, and many
homosexuals reciprocate, which of them should cease and desist?
Gordon proposes to answer this by determining "who is the least cost
avoider" or, perhaps, the least changer of taste, ascribing this way of
attempting to solve the problem to the typical "economist.""
To be sure, this is precisely the approach of the Coasean
economist. 69 But in the absence of scientifically reliable interpersonal
" Conservatives, particularly religious conservatives, object to homosexuality on
the ground that it is forbidden in the bible.
4

See ROTHBARD, UTILITYAND ECONOMICS, supra note 58, at 2.

Id.
Negative externalities occur whenever one person harms another and the law
does not allow the victim to be compensated for this harm or to be granted an
injunction to prevent it. Such harms range from railroads creating sparks that set
ablaze a farmer's haystacks, to smoke pollution, to jamming radio signals. These
externalities also include competition; if one individual opens a grocery store across
the street from that of another individual and wins half the original's customers, this,
too, can be perceived as a negative externality for which the law will not compensate.
For libertarians, the key distinction is not harm to second or third parties. Rather,
the distinction revolves around whether any uninvited border crossing has occurred.
If a person dumps garbage on another's lawn, a trespass has occurred that the law
should stop. However, engaging in competition does not involve any violation of
personal or private property rights. For more on this, see generally Murray N.
Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
A RECONCILIATION (Walter Block, ed., 1990).
67

See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1753 n. 64.
See id.

For critiques of Coaseanism, see Roy E. Cordato, Subjective Value, Time Passage,
and the Economics of Harmful Effects, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 229-44 (1989); ROY E.
CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND ExTERNALmEs IN AN OPEN-ENDED UNIVERSE:

A

MODERN AUsTRIAN PERSPECrIVE (1992); Roy E. Cordato, Knowledge Problems and the
Problem of Social Cost, 14 HisT. OF ECON. THOUGHT (1992); Elisabeth Krecke, Law and
the Market Order An Austrian Critiqueof the Economic Analysis of Law, in COMMENTARIES
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comparisons of utility, there is simply no nonarbitrary way to resolve
this debate. In their absence, moreover, it is not even a meaningful
question. If the right to engage in homosexual activity depends upon
so insecure a foundation, there is little hope for its defense.
Fortunately, there is a justification for gays to engage in
consensual, private, adult sex. It is the "live and let live" philosophy
that emerges in libertarianism. Since neither homosexuality nor
heterosexuality involves per se invasions of other people or their
property, both are licit in the free society. Neither can be justly
prohibited. But this means that we have to count as invalid all
notions of "externalities" and "least cost avoiders." And, if it is
permissible to use in the case of sex, this applies as well to blackmail.
D. Imperfect Knowledge
Gordon suggests that markets are efficient and can be relied
upon to sort out the aforementioned problems, stating that "it might
be argued that allowing blackmail data to be bought and sold is the
best way to finesse the economic unknowns." 70 Gordon relies on two
experts, Friedrich A. Hayek7 ' and Coase,72 to support this possibility.
Her reliance on the former is unobjectionable; Hayek played a major
role in demonstrating that markets process information with
efficiency beyond the scope of government." Gordon's reliance on
ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 86 (Robert W. McGee ed., 1997); GARY NORTH, TOOLS OF
DOMINION: THE CASE LAWS OF EXODUS (1990); GARY NORTH, THE COASE THEOREM,
TYLER, TEXAS (1992); Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, in
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 233 (Walter Block ed., 1990).
70
71

Gordon, supranote 2, at 1754.
See id. at 1754 n.66 (citing Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35

AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524-25 (1945) (asserting that "decentralized decisionmaking can
often utilize knowledge better than centralized planning").
7
See id. at 1754 n.67 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Social Cost]).
73 Some commentators, however, believe that Hayek merely scratched
the surface
of the case against governmental central planning. Hayek stopped at the knowledge
problem-it would be too difficult for the central planners to find out in a timely way
the information needed to rationally plan. A more radical criticism of socialism is
that, even if there were no such information difficulty, the planners still could not
engage in rational action without private property rights, individual choices, and free
market prices based on the appraisement of values on the part of market
participants. A second problem with Hayek is that he made many compromises with
democratic socialists and other critics of the market. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Herbener,
Calculation and the Question of Arithmetic, 9 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 151 (1995); HansHermann Hoppe, Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?, 9 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON.
143 (1995); Joseph T. Salerno, A Final Word: Calculation,Knowledge and Appraisement,
9 REV. AUsTRIAN ECON. 141 (1995); Joseph T. Salerno, Ludwig von Mises as Social
Rationalist,4 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 26 (1990); Joseph T. Salerno, Mises and Hayek, 6
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Coase, however, presents grave difficulties. First, the author states
that "the Coase theorem teaches that in a properly functioning
market, absent transactions costs, people will trade a resource until it
reaches its highest value use regardless of where the government
initially assigns its ownership., 74 For this assertion to be true,
however, the loser in the lawsuit would have to possess the financial
ability to bribe the winner to allow resources to flow to what Coase
considers to be their optimal use.75
Gordon latches on to this Coasian "straw man" in an effort to
undermine the implications that Hayek's analysis would have for the
legalization of blackmail. 6 The author asserts:
[I]n blackmail the transaction costs can be so high as to preclude
all the affected parties from making their preferences known
through the market, thus preventing transactions from reliably
directing resources to their highest valued uses. For example,
there may be a multitude of voters who would be willing to pay
something to learn that their mayor has embezzled public funds.
Yet a person who has this information cannot practicably contact
this mass of possible buyers; even if he could, free rider strategic
behavior could well forestall agreement, particularly when
coupled with the well-recognized difficulties that acconpany any
attempt to sell a secret to people ignorant of its content.

REV. AUSTRIANECON. 113-46 (1992).

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1754.
See Walter Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights, I J. LIBERTARIAN
STUD. 111, 111, 112 (1977) [hereinafter Block, Coase and Demsetz].
76 See Gordon, supra note 2, at
1754.
77 Id. Gordon's strategy here reminds the reader of the argument
that antitrust
advocates utilized to support their position.
First, the technique defines a
misbegotten criterion for efficiency, such as "perfect competition" in the antitrust
context and Coasian theory in the present case. In the antitrust context, the
hypothetical state against which the real world is to be measured is a state where
there are millions of firms, each selling a small percentage of the total product,
which is homogeneous. In addition, information is costless, there is a constant state
of equilibrium, and no profits are ever made. The Coasian equivalent of this is a
world with zero transaction costs.
Second, the technique criticizes the real world for not living up to these artificial
standards set by the criterion. The difficulty with this procedure is easy to see. It
would be similar to defining a life-sized version of the Barbie Doll as the criteria for
successful adult women and then fining all those human females who do not
measure up to the criterion. Several authors, however, have prescribed an antidote
to this stratagem in the case of antitrust and monopoly. See, e.g., DOMINICK T.
ARMENTANO,ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986); DONALD ARMSTRONG,
COMPETITION VERSUS MONOPOLY: COMBINED POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE (Walter Block ed.,
74
75

1982); Boudreaux & DiLorenzo, supra note 56; DiLorenzo, supra note 56; Fred
McChesney, Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago's Contradictory Views, 10 CATO J. 775
(1991); William F. Shugart, Jr., Don't Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!, 6 CATOJ. 925
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This reliance upon the theories of Coase, however, is not
sufficient to support Gordon's antilegalization goals.7 8 In drawing
this conclusion, Gordon ignores the phenomenon of externality
internalization. 79 A blackmailer would not need to deal directly with
thousands of potentially free-riding citizens and convince them to be
curious of something about which they are ignorant. On the
contrary, newspapers and magazines-not even those limited to
muckraking-would be more than happy to publicize a mayor's
embezzlement. The publications could profit on this information
through increased subscriptions and greater advertising revenues.
The blackmailer, therefore, would not need to deal directly with a
mass audience. The threat of exposure in such venues tends to keep
a damper on activities of this sort on the part of our elected officials.
Gordon, however, does not accept this reasoning or the "micro"
perspective of utilitarianism, according to which the only actors are
the blackmailer and the blackmailee.80 In contrast, the author is
concerned with the macro "societal economic welfare," which
requires that the entire citizenry be made aware of the mayor's
peccadilloes. 8' Absent interpersonal comparisons of utility,2 though,
(1987); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Why Not Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at
23.
71

See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1754-55 (citing Coase, Social Cost, supra note 71,
1-

44 (1960)).
79

Externality internalization is the process through which the market deals with

the issue of externalities. Consider, for example, the difficulty of creating a private
park in what is now a slum area. The owner of the park will only be able to recoup
his investment through admission charges. However, if successful, the park also
presumably would increase real estate values in the surrounding neighborhood. The
problem-the "market failure" of externalities-is that the potential park owner does
not own these properties and thus is not in a position to take advantage of these
benefits "external" to his park.
The solution-the internalization of this
externality-is for him to purchase these lands before word gets out about his
forthcoming urban park. He can do this because he is the only one who knows
where he will locate this park.
80 This perspective is, essentially, Austrian economics.
See generally ROTHBARD,
MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE, Los Angeles, Nash, 1962; LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN
ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (1966). The Austrian School of economics is well
known for its emphasis on methodological individualism. In this view, economic acts
essentially occur on an individual level; groups are only amalgamations of
individuals. There are no such things as groups apart from the individuals who
comprise them. In the present context, from an Austrian point of view, there are
only two actors in the contract: the blackmailer and the blackmailee. No one else
has any standing.
"I See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1755. Gordon asserts that, because of well-known
difficulties affecting markets in information, "most of the societal benefits that could
flow from disclosure are likely to be kept external to the blackmailer's decision." Id. at
1754-55. As a result, the author concludes, "the outcome of dealings among
blackmailer, victim, and other possible buyers [of information] will prove unreliable
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it cannot be demonstrated that the value to the masses of the
disclosure of this information will be greater than the value to the
mayor of his privacy. Demanding this information dispersal in the
name of justice, moreover, presumes the legitimacy of a positive
obligation: that the ignorant citizenry has a right, not only against
the thieving mayor, which it certainly does, but also against the
innocent blackmailer, that he disclose the knowledge that he alone
(apart from the mayor, of course) possesses.
In light of these considerations, it is difficult to conclude that a
blackmailer should be forced to share knowledge with the masses, if
the mayor is willing to compensate him for his silence. Gordon
argues, based on the Coase theorem, that the public allocation of
"fundamental resources," such as reputation, can enhance wealth.8 '
The author claims that the free market system cannot create values
sufficiently well to determine whether it would be more beneficial for
a blackmailer to retain confidential information or to reveal it to the
public.84 Under a free enterprise system, if the blackmailee values the
secret more than the price demanded by the blackmailer, he will pay
and retain his privacy. If not, he risks exposure.
Gordon arrives at the opposite conclusion because she conflates
the Coasian system with free enterprise or capitalism. 85 Capitalism is
noncontroversially defined as the totality of all voluntary trades; that
is, when one person trades his rightfully owned property for that of
another. Coase, in sharp contrast, specifically addresses himself to
the situation in which a trade cannot take place because there is a
as a guide to societal economic welfare." Id. at 1755.
82 As an example
of an interpersonal comparison of utility, consider the
following: A values his pen at 10 utils, and B values his hat at 40 utils. Thus, both A
and B regard B's hat as worth exactly four of A's pens. Needless to say, since there
are no such things as utils, nor indeed, any other measure of happiness, this
comparison fails on two grounds. First neither A nor B can rate items on such a
scale. Second, there can be no interpersonal comparison of the items. The
relevance of this explanation to the textual discussion is that Gordon is maintaining
that the interests of the entire citizenry in the mayor's difficulties are greater than
the mayor's interest is his own privacy. Therefore, social welfare will be enhanced if
the mayor's interests are disregarded for those of the citizenry. Even apart from such
specific valuations, however, there is no way to demonstrate that the mayor's privacy
is more valuable to him than is the citizenry's interest in obtaining the information.
M SeeGordon, supranote 2, at 1755.
84 Id at 1754-57.
5Id
at 1756-57. Although Gordon reasonably enough equates "allowing... data
to be bought and sold" with "markets," she identifies "markets" with "the Coase
Theorem." However, the Coase theorem and the Coasianism based upon that
theorem are really an attack on markets, particularly free markets, in that private
property rights undergird free enterprise, and the Coase theorem is singularly
antipathetic to such rights.
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dispute as to who possesses the rights to the property in question.8
But in our system, only the courts, not the market, can make such
determinations.87
In the dispute over blackmail, no real debate exists regarding
who is the legitimate owner of the relevant property rights. Assuming
that the blackmailer learned the embarrassing secret without
violating any person or his property rights, the blackmailer may
dispose of this information precisely as he wishes. On the other
hand, of course, if knowledge of the secret came to him improperly
(for example, through theft, torture, or kidnapping) then the
blackmailer must be punished-not for blackmail, but for these other
activities. Because the fruit of the poisoned tree is itself poisoned,
blackmail under these conditions also would be properly illegal, but
not because of anything intrinsic to that practice. Rather, blackmail
should be considered illicit because of these improper antecedents.m
For Coase, these matters would be examined very differendy because,
as an unsophisticated utilitarian at heart, he has no real theory of
property rights.q
Gordon does not seem to realize that Coase can be interpreted
in a manner consistent with her position regarding the legalization of
blackmail." All the Coasian judge need do is declare that the secret
See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 71, at 8-15. This Article is mainly concerned
not with markets, within which trade occurs, but rather with lawsuits regarding
nuisance or pollution, wherein no trade occurs, no matter what else is transpiring.
87 Assuming that this is true, no free market
actually exists that permits multiple
public and private defense agencies to compete for services. For an explication of
that system, see supra note 5. The philosophy adumbrated therein is one of
libertarian anarchism, or anarcho-capitalism.
Under such a philosophy, all
government functions, including armies, courts and police, are provided through the
voluntary market place, such as through competing defense-insurance-mediation
agencies.
8 This reasoning would apply to any act that is normally legal. For example,
driving a taxicab is a completely legal practice. If the driver stole the vehicle or was
drunk, then operating the cab would become an illegal activity because of the
underlying illicit action, which precedes the seemingly legal act.
In Coase's view, when a dispute arises concerning property ownership, the
disputed property should vest in the person who, in a world of zero transactions
costs, would have ended up owning the property in question. See Coase, Social Cost,
supra note 71, at 38. That is, had he not been awarded it, he would have bribed the
winner of a judicial decision into giving him the property under dispute. For
example, Coase maintains that property under dispute should be awarded to the
person who values it most highly, not to the rightful owner. In other words, for
Coase, the rightful owner, to the extent that there can be any such thing, is the
person who values the property most strongly, not necessarily the one who purchased
it or built it.
" See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 71. That Coase's writing can be read
as supporting Gordon's argument against blackmail should occasion little surprise
86
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in the hands of the multitude of voters would be more valuable than
if controlled solely by the mayor and the blackmailer, in order to
reconcile Coase's principles"" with Gordon's assertions.
Gordon is mistaken in thinking that the Coase theory cannot be
utilized to reach her favored conclusion. In fact, contrary to what the
author has seemingly concluded, Coase actually agrees with her views
on blackmail.
Therefore, Gordon's attempt to use Coase as a foil
against which to contrast her own position fails because he argues on
the same side of the blackmail debate as does she. 3
given that Coase has previously drawn the same conclusions as Gordon regarding
blackmail. See generally Coase, McCorkle, supra note 23.
91 See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 71.
The principle of Coase in law and
economics is to maximize wealth. For example, in a 1987 article he stated:
In a blackmailing scheme, the person who will pay the most for the
right to stop the action threatened is normally the person being
blackmailed. If the right to stop this action is denied to others, that is,
blackmail is made illegal, transaction costs are reduced, factors of
production are released for other purposes and the value of
production is increased. This is an approach which comes quite
naturally to an economist and was certainly the way in which I first
analyzed the problem of blackmail.
Id. The problem with all such approaches, of course, is that they founder on the lack
of interpersonal comparisons of utility or wealth.
92 See Coase, McCorkle, supra note 23, at 673. Coase
states:
Business negotiations (which may also cause anxiety) either lead to a
breakdown of the negotiations or they lead to a contract. There is, at
any rate, an end. But in the ordinary blackmail case there is no end.
The victim, once he succumbs to the blackmailer, remains in his grip
for an indefinite period. It is moral murder.
Id. It is hard to see what more Coase can possibly do to subscribe to the
antiblackmail legalization sentiments of Gordon than to characterize this practice as
"moral murder."
93 Gordon also criticizes Coase on grounds very similar to those
employed by this
Author. Compare Gordon, supra note 2, at 1757, with Walter Block, Free Market
Transportation: Denationalizingthe Roads, 3J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 209 (1979). Gordon
states:
[T]he celebrity is limited in his ability to protect his reputation by the
amount of money he possesses or can borrow. If the celebrity does not
have enough money to outbid the network, then the highest valued use
of the information would now seem to be publication, even if all that
has changed is the initial assignment of rights.
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1757. This makes it doubly difficult to understand her
analysis of Coase. Gordon and this Author agree-contrary to the positions of Coase,
Demsetz, and their followers-that the initial assignment of property rights can
determine who will be able to outbid whom in the zero transaction costs world.
Gordon focuses on the point that "[i]f the celebrity does not have enough money to
outbid the network, then the highest valued use of the information would not seem
to be publication, even if all that has changed is the initial assignment of rights." Id.
This is precisely the point this Author has made against Coase and Demsetz in other
articles, utilizing a "flower pot" example. See Block, Coase and Demsetz, supra note 75,
at 111-15.
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Gordon next argues that there are

"certain fundamental

resources . . . whose possession can affect our ability to enjoy all
other goods . . . examples include life, sight, and one's standing in a

community of peers."9 4 Gordon believes that "[r]eputation may well
be one of those fundamental resources," and reputation is precisely
what blackmail threatens to harm.95 Gordon makes the same mistake
as Adam Smith 6 did when he failed to solve the diamonds-water
paradox. That paradox asks how diamonds, which are useless in
preserving human life, at least when compared to water, nevertheless
are more highly valued on the market than that life-preserving liquid.
Economists did not address this enigma until the marginalist
revolution 7 of the 1870s. That revolution argued that it was
illegitimate to compare the value of water against that of diamonds
because no human being has ever been called upon to choose
between them in their totality. Instead, objects should be considered
from the point of view of an actual market participant, who chooses
only between small (or marginal) amounts of goods and services. In
other words, the value of objects should be considered as a matter of
more or less, not all or none; hence, there is no such thing as a
"fundamental" good.
IV. A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL VIEW
A. Background
Moving from her economic grounds for the prohibition of
blackmail, Gordon next advances several deontological 8 arguments. °q
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1755.
Id.
%" See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
4

q5

OF NATIONS 132 (Prometheus Books 1965)
(1776).
97 The marginalist revolution in economics directed
attention not to the total
amounts of anything, such as diamonds or water, but rather to the marginal amounts
between which humans choose, such as a cup of water or a swimming pool of water.
From this perspective, it is easy to see why diamonds are so valuable and water is not;
there is very little of the former, relative to demand, while there is a great deal of the
latter. See, e.g.,
CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (James Dingwall & Bert F.

Hoselitz, Institute for Humane Studies, 1976); W.
POLITICAL ECONOMY

(3d ed. 1888);

STANLEYJEVONS, THE THEORY OF
LEON WALRAS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

(1874).
98 "Deontological" means theoretical and morality based, as opposed
to
utilitarian or pragmatic. See Gordon. supra note 2, at 1759.
49 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1758-74. In beginning her deontological analysis,
Gordon quite rightly rejects Robert Nozick's critique that blackmail constitutes a
"nonproductive" exchange by pondering whether the happening of such
occurrences is "wrong in itself." See id. at 1758 (citing NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note
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The author claims that when blackmail occurs, "[o]ne person
deliberately seeks to harm another to serve her own ends-to exact
money or other advantage-and does so in a context where she has
no conceivable justification for her act."' ° If this is an accurate
characterization,'0 ' one may agree that such activity is indeed
despicable, immoral, and vicious; the law, however, still should not
02
ban it. Gordon's argument is susceptible to a reductio ad absurdum.'
For example, an extremely attractive man may decide to gratuitously
harm another man by alienating his wife's affections away from
him-unless the husband pays the man one million dollars. To carry
out his threat, the man proceeds to seduce the other man's wife. In
this scenario, the seducer, who has no "conceivable justification" for
his act, is deliberately seeking to harm another man to serve the
seducer's goals. This is despicable, unjust, and immoral, but the man
should nonetheless not be incarcerated. After all, he threatens (or
actually carries out) not a rape but rather a seduction, which is
defined as a voluntary act between consenting adults.0 3 Gordon
states that "[t]he violent and unlawful nature of a threatened act may
make the extortionist's moral wrong more serious ('I will break your
29, at 84-86; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 16263 (1980)).
100 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1758.
101 This seems to be the crux of Gordon's case against blackmail. If so, the author
appears to have dropped her focus on "central case" blackmail so as to concentrate
on the garden variety of this act.
o2 A reductio ad absurdum is a critique that takes an argument to its logical
conclusion to show its absurdity.
103 See Walter E. Williams, The Legitimate Role of Government in
a Free Society, in THE
FRANK M. ENGLE LECTURES 633, 640 (Roger C. Bird ed., 1998). Williams argues:
The test for moral relations among people is to ask whether the act was
peaceable and voluntary or violent and involuntary. Put another way,
was there seduction, or was there rape?
Seduction (voluntary
exchange) occurs when we offer our fellow man the following
proposition: I will make you feel good if you make me feel good. An
example of this occurs when I visit my grocer. In effect I offer, "If you
make me feel good by giving me that loaf of bread, I will make you feel
good by giving you a dollar." Whenever there is seduction, we have a
positive-sum game; i.e., both parties are better off in their own
estimation.
Rape (involuntary exchange), on the other hand, happens when we
offer our fellow man the following proposition: "If you do not make
me feel good, I am going to make you feel bad." An example of this
would be where I walked into my grocer's store with a gun and offered,
"If you do not make me feel good by giving me that loaf of bread, I am
going to make you feel bad by shooting you." Whenever there is rape,
we have a zero-sum game, i.e., in order for one person to be better off,
it necessarily requires that another be made worse off.
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legs' as compared with 'I will disclose your secret'), but a threat may
constitute a moral wrong even if the threatened act is neither
wrongful nor unlawful."'0 4 In actuality, however, the law should ban
only extortion because it threatens illegal acts, while blackmail does
not. The fact that both are immoral should not be allowed to
In articulating her argument,
obscure this crucial distinction.
Gordon continually allows the immorality of blackmail to obscure her
reasoning. For example, the author highlights the fact that to
commit blackmail is "to do an act that is wrong,"'05 but fails to realize
that many people consider many legal acts to be wrong, such as
smoking, homosexuality, and suicide.
B. Victimization and Outrage
Gordon, citing an article by Thomas Nagel for support, further
asserts that a victim necessarily "feels outrage when he is deliberately
harmed."'0 6 The author opines that, because blackmail is a harm that
presumably impugns the worth of the targeted individual, it must be
outlawed.'0 7 This reasoning, however, is problematic for several
reasons. First, Gordon has not established that the blackmailee is a
victim, and not a beneficiary, of the blackmailer. Second, whether
the blackmailee feels outrage is irrelevant. So many people feel
outrage regarding a wide array of subjects that the existence of the
blackmailee's outrage in this scenario is not significant. Third,
people do not necessarily feel outrage when deliberately wronged, or
even when harmed. According to psychological research on the
matter, people feel outrage not so much because of what happens to
them, but instead because of what they tell themselves about those
experiences.' " Moreover, while people usually have limited control

"0

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1759 n.86.

'0

I&at 1760.

107

Id.

I& at 1761.

,o8 See generally MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN & DAVID RAMSEY STEELE, THREE MINUTE
THERAPY: CHANGE YOUR THINKING, CHANGE YOUR LIFE (1997); ALBERT ELLIS & ROBERT
A. HARPER, A GUIDE TO RATIONAL LIVING (1961). Psychotherapists of the Rational
Emotive Behavioral Therapy School (REBT) put this is the form of A,B,C: A is an

actual event that, purportedly, causes upset; for example, getting fired from one's job
or losing one's girlfriend. C is the emotional consequence; for example, depression.
Most commentators claim that A causes C. But the REBT theoretician claims that it
is not A that causes C; rather, it is B, the person's belief about A. If he has an
irrational belief (for example, that it is horrible to lose his job or girlfriend) then this

is what causes the upset. In contrast, if he has a rational belief about what befalls him
(for example, that such occurrences are indeed unfortunate, but he can live with
them) then the A will not cause the C.
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over their experiences, they tend to have almost total control (at least
potentially) over what they think about those experiences.""" Thus, if
an individual thinks "I cannot stand to be treated unfairly," then that
individual will probably feel outrage when he perceives that he has
been slighted. In contrast, an individual's internal thoughts may
travel along equally true but more psychologically healthy channels,
such as thinking, when treated poorly, "It may be uncomfortable, but
I can stand it, and indeed, I have stood far worse in the past." Such
an individual is far less likely to experience outrage.'I0
C. Intent, Consequences, and the Doctrine of Double Effect
In the next section of her article, Gordon introduces a series of
very fine distinctions, explaining that some deontological
philosophers "distinguish between direct and oblique intention,
between foreseen and intended effects or among effects that vary in
their degree of 'closeness' with the intended effect.""'
Gordon
attempts to use these distinctions to shed light on the puzzle
presented by Guido Calabresi." '
At this point in her argument, Gordon discusses the Doctrine of
Double Effect (DDE)." 3 Gordon explains that, according to the
proponents of DDE, "it can sometimes be morally permissible to do
an act that has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good,
so long as the harms are not directly intended." ' 4 This doctrine may
well be a powerful tool in some contexts, but it fails to support
Gordon's arguments. First, the debate over the legalization of
blackmail is not concerned with what is "morally permissible," but
rather with what should be legal. This distinction is important
because overeating, smoking, suicide, and homosexuality are all seen

...See generally

EDELSTEIN & STEELE,

supra note 108; ELLIS &

HARPER,

supra note

108.
"o See EDELSTEIN & STEELE, supra note 108, at 1. Edelstein and Steele explain that
"[t]he way you feel emotionally, arises from the way you think. Your feelings come
from your thinking." Id. The authors continue "[e]vents do not directly affect our
psyches the way a needle in the arm causes pain (even then the pain has gone
through our brain before we can feel it)." Id. at 2.
.. Gordon, supra note 2, at 1761. The point is to focus more attention on
motivations, as opposed to objective results. In gangster movies, when one gang
member kills another, he sometimes declares that this it is 'just business, it's not
personal." In effect, he is attempting to obviate himself from the charge that the
"harm is directly intended."
"' See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW:
PRIVATE LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM (1985).
"' See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1763; see also supra text accompanying note 36.
114 Gordon, supra note 2,
at 1763.
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by many as morally impermissible, and yet, because none of them
necessarily involves initiatory violence, they should not be legally
proscribed.
Second, no negative consequences follow from
blackmail, at least as compared to gossip."

5

The willingness, even

eagerness, of the blackmailee to engage in this contractual
agreement demonstrates this lack of negative consequences.
During the course of her analysis, Gordon essentially converts
DDE into the "doctrine of single effect" (DSE)."" She explains that
"when one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects have
little or no deontological significance" for purposes of analyzing
blackmail." 1 7 Elaborating on this point, Gordon continues:
Under my suggested correlative, DSE, one would ask if the actor
would change his behavior if the beneficial effects were eliminated.
Using that test, it appears that no significance should be given to
either the lawful nature of the threatened disclosure or the
potentially beneficial side effects of blackmail.
Were the
disclosure unlawful or impossible but the victim still capable of
being frightened into paing, the typical blackmailer would
extract the money anyway.
Gordon's use of the phrase "were the disclosure unlawful"
almost reaches the crux of the matter because, at first glance, this is
precisely the point of the libertarian-the disclosure of gossip is
patently not unlawful. This revelation is exactly the reason that
banning the threat of that which is itself not unlawful-the disclosure
of gossip-would be impermissible, and moreover illogical.
Gordon's characterization of DSE requires the inclusion of the
word "properly" so that her assertion reads as follows: "Were the
disclosure to be properly unlawful but the victim still capable of being
frightened into paying, the typical blackmailer would extract the
money anyway."
With the addition of this qualifying phrase,
Gordon's DSE conclusion logically follows. Under these conditions,
even the libertarian would agree that blackmail, not merely extortion,
should be illegal.
Consider an illustration. You hire me, among other things, to
refrain from gossiping about you (for example, I am your private
secretary). You pay me good money for this service, and I agree to
undertake it. Then, instead of keeping my part of the bargain, I turn
against you and threaten to expose your secrets unless you pay me an

"4
117
'1
"is

See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1764-65.
Id.

Id. at 1765.
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additional (and very large) amount of money. Namely, I am now
asking you to pay me for services for which you have already paid me
(my secretarial salary). But this is the equivalent of theft.
Or consider this scenario. I blackmail you for x-dollars to keep
your secret forevermore. One year later, I come back to you and
demand more money as the price of my continued silence. Again, in
effect, I am demanding additional money for doing what I have
already contracted to do. Clearly, I am a crook.
Since stealing is a paradigm case of illegitimate behavior, at least
for the libertarian, both actions should be proscribed by law on a
If, then, Gordon accepts my "friendly"
deontological basis.
amendment, her views are fully congruent with libertarianism. But
this means that people such as confidential secretaries and
blackmailers too should be forced not to gossip, if they have
contractually obligated themselves to refrain from speaking ill of the
blackmailee.
Without the inclusion of the term "properly" in her discussion,
Gordon's statement regarding DSE is either false or irrelevant.
Gordon opines that if disclosure were unlawful, then the law would
have to legally ban blackmail. In reality, though, disclosure is not
(ordinarily) unlawful, and blackmail, therefore, should not be
outlawed. Gordon rejects this analytical framework; she criticizes the
blackmailer "because his intent is directed to the money, not to the
disclosure or beneficial side effects that [the disclosure] might
produce."" 9 The ordinary tradesman, such as a butcher or a baker,
however, does not care at all about the benefits his customers derive
from his products beyond the fact his goods will not sell unless they
are pleasing to his customers.
Gordon states that "[m]y argument, by contrast, is that a threat
with an immoral end can be condemned as coercive without
reference to the nature of the threatened action." 20 The author fails
to explain how an immoral but not coercive end possibly can be
converted into a coercive one. 2 ' The fact that "the blackmailer's end is
harm"' 2 is of no consequence; the blackmailer's actions may be
morally irredeemable, but they are certainly legal.'23
119

Id.

120

Id. at 1765 n.109.

:21

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

2' Gordon, supra note 2, at 1766.
Gordon would punish people solely for their motives, not their acts. If she

123

were a judge, and two blackmailers who acted identically were brought before her,
she would presumably dismiss the case against the one whose motives she favored

2000]

BLACKMAIL

1211

D. The Property Rights Objection
As further support for the prohibition of blackmail, Gordon
notes approvingly that Sir Frederick Pollack stated that "'a general
proposition of English law is that it is a wrong to do willful harm to
24
This
one's neighbor without lawful justification or excuse."
25
assertion, however, is an example of legal positivism.

Gordon mistakenly relies on malicious intent, but does not
support this reasoning; for her, if there is any maliciousness involved,
property rights have no relevance. 2 6 This would force jurists to get
into the heads of defendants and begs the question of why an
individual's motivations, and not his objective acts, should be made
the bedrock of law. Nastiness, which has sociobiological survival
value for the human race,'2 7 is a valuable human characteristic, fully
worthy of being maintained in the panoply of our emotions.
Furthermore, people have a right to act out of malicious motivation,
and not against the other, whose motives she opposed. This, to say the least, runs
180 degrees counter to Hayek's "The Rule of Law." See generally F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973). Gordon, presumably, would welcome the new hate
crimes legislation, which would punish criminals not only for their acts, but also for
their thoughts.
124 Id. at 1767 (quoting Philip Halpern, International Torts and the Restatement:
A
Petitionfor Rehearing,7 BUFF. L. REV. 21 (1957) (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, LAW OF
TORTS (1st ed. 1887)).
12
Legal positivism is the view that, because something is the law, it should be the
law.
126 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1766. Gordon places quotation marks around the
phrase "Property Right," an act that can be interpreted as her dismissal of this
concept from her analysis. See id. More explicitly, she claims that "to demand a
property right as a premise for giving protection against harm is topsy-turvy." See id.
at 1768. This may be "topsy-turvy" in Gordon's view, but this is precisely the
libertarian perspective, if her "harm" is substituted for rights violations. This is
because, under the libertarian legal code, it is permissible to "harm" people in all
sorts of ways (for example, competing for their customers or girlfriends), but it is
alwaTys improper to violate their rights.
See generally EDMUND 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1980). Sociobiology is the
theory that, to a great degree, people act as they do because certain behavioral
characteristics had survival value hundreds of thousands of years ago. For example,
men are more aggressive than women because this enhanced the likelihood of
survival of prehistoric prehuman tribes. A similar assertion can be made for
nastiness. People presently are "nasty" because they are descended from ancestors
who had this characteristic, which helped them survive earlier eras. If there were a
tribe of "nice" humans, they became extinct because such a trait was not conducive
For more on this, see generally R. AXELROD, THE
to staving off extinction.
THE ADAPTED MIND:
EVOLUTIONARY
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE (J.H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); D.M.
Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE (1994); RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A
DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE (1995); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976);
STEPHEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997).
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provided, of course, that they do not violate another person or the
property rights of another person.128
As her analysis continues, Gordon issues the following statement
regarding the relevance of the legality of the information disclosure
underlying blackmail:
It is irrelevant whether or not it would be proper for the
blackmailer to disclose the information, and thus destroy
something the victim may value at a price even higher than the
goods demanded in the blackmail transaction. For no disclosure
is intended and none occurs. Whatever justification might
support disclosure, none supports a threat
' whose only motive and
effect is to extract money or compliance. 2
If Gordon's basic premise (malicious motivations are the key to
criminality, not objective invasive acts) could be accepted, at least
some value could be placed on this assessment. There would, of
course, still be the difficulty of discerning the blackmailer's
motivation because no blackmailer would ever admit to being a
central case blackmailer. Each blackmailer would claim at least some
benefit, whether personal or for the "public good," in exposing the
secrets of the blackmailee.
In any event, no actual blackmail can be defined as the "central
case blackmail" because human motivations are so complex and
multidimensional. Central case blackmail has all the earmarks of a
theoretical construct, not an actual occurrence in the real world.
The purpose of a theoretical construct is purely intellectual or
heuristic-to sharpen our thinking or to clarify categories.'0 Anyone
who expects to find a theoretical construct in the real world will be
sadly disappointed. Gordon not only expects to find her theoretical
construct in reality, she is basing her theory
of blackmail's illegality
3
1
prevalence.1
its
as
well
as
presence,
its
on

128 It is the essence of the libertarian philosophy that people can act out of the
most base of human motivations, as long as they do not physically abuse, without
permission, the persons or property of anyone else. See supra note 10.
12
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1769-70.
1 An example of a theoretical construct in economics is the evenly rotating
economy of Ludwig von Mises. See generally LUDWIG VON MisEs, HUMAN ACTION
(1949). Another example in economics is the perfectly competitive model employed
by most textbook writers in the field. Examples in other fields include the
frictionless world in physics and the perfect vacuum in chemistry. In mathematics,
examples are the line with no width or the point with neither length nor width.
These constructs are all meant as nonexistent end points and can have intellectual
value even though they are not found in reality.
's'
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1767, 1768, 1769.
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Moreover, it is false for Gordon to claim, even of central case
blackmail, that "no disclosure is intended."' 32 On the contrary,
disclosure is intended, if the blackmailee remains obdurate and
refuses to pay. The truth of the matter is that in this "case" the
blackmailer obtains no psychic benefit from disclosure; his motive is
only the money, and he receives no additional benefit from seeing
the blackmailee squirm. It would be much more accurate to declare
that the central case blackmailer intends no disclosure unless he is
balked.
Furthermore, threats intended "to extract money" are not
necessarily legally improper. According to Gordon's reasoning,
though, the law would prohibit both bluffing in poker and hard
bargaining in commerce. Thus, Gordon's critique indicates hostility
to the free market, where people can buy and sell at any agreed upon
price. In contrast, she implicitly supports a form of price controls,
limited to whatever is necessary to preclude money "extraction. ' "'s"
In a successful poker bluff (for example, your victim folds even
though he holds better cards than you), no disclosure of cards is
intended, and none occurs, just as in central case blackmail. Why
that should occasion legal opprobrium is not clear. In chess, the
sacrifice of a pawn, let alone a queen, is akin to a "bluff." Were this
view to become incorporated into the law of the land, it is difficult to
avoid the implication that the Game of Kings would become far less
interesting.
E. ComparingBlackmail with the Ordinary Commercial Transaction
Gordon next addresses directly the libertarian view of
blackmail. 34 She is one of the very few mainstream writers on
blackmail to have seriously considered the libertarian perspective on
this matter. 135

Id. at 1769-70.
Id. One might well argue that Gordon is doing a bit more than "implicitly"
supporting price controls. When someone opposes money "extraction," he is
indicating that certain prices should be illegal. For example, suppose it costs five
dollars to manufacture a wristwatch, and Gordon is willing to concede that a profit of
one dollar is not "extractive." If the manufacturer charges more than six dollars, the
difference between that amount and six dollars would be an "extraction" of the
customer. If the price is nine dollars, then the extraction is three dollars. Because
Gordon opposes extraction, she must, if she is to be logically consistent, favor a price
maximum (or price control) over the wristwatches of six dollars.
13
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1770-71.
1.5Gordon, however, is not the only mainstream writer to address the libertarian
POSNER, ANALYsis, supra note 26, at 1817-18, 1828, 1832.
perspective. See, e.g.,
132
13
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Libertarians, Gordon correctly states, see no legal distinction
between blackmail and ordinary commercial transactions.
She
disagrees with this view on three distinct grounds. First, Gordon
maintains that "the central case blackmail transaction is
nonallocative, while the ordinary commercial exchange is
allocative." l Her claim is that "social welfare" would decrease under
blackmail, but not under ordinary trade.3 7 This concept, however, is
logically incoherent without interpersonal comparisons of utility, and
the latter are invalid. The point is that, because one person's utility
cannot be compared with another's, there is no such thing as social
welfare. Without this latter concept, Gordon's criticism fails.
Gordon's second criticism of libertarianism is that "the
blackmailer intends to harm." 39 This, however, is frequently true: it
applies to Don Rickles, every nagging wife, every scolding parent,
every boss chewing out an employee, every employee bad-mouthing
the firm that employs him, every teacher upbraiding a student, every
pupil criticizing a professor. Even Gordon, in the present context,
"intends to harm" libertarianism, at least insofar as her argument
pertains to blackmail.
Gordon's third critique of the libertarian perspective of
blackmail is that "the buyer of silence in an extortion transaction
suffers a net harm, while the buyer in an ordinary transaction is
benefited.""'4 This assertion, though, contains two errors. First, the
victim of extortion is the buyer of protection against the threat of
violence. In contrast, the buyer of silence is the target of blackmail.
The victim of extortion does indeed suffer a net harm, but the
blackmailee, as has been shown, 4' is a net beneficiary of the blackmail
transaction. Gordon herself admits this when she concedes that "the
victim may value (silence) at a price even higher than the goods

" Gordon, supranote 2, at 1770.
'

See id. at 1750 n.54.

1.38See ROTHBARD, UTILITY AND ECONOMICS, supra note 58, at 21. An interpersonal

comparison of utility is of the following sort: Alice likes apples more than Bill likes
beans. It is one thing to say that Alice is shorter or weighs less or can run faster than
Bill; there are scientific measures of distance, weight, and speed. There are,
however, no units of happiness, or likes and dislikes, on the basis of which
interpersonal comparisons of utility can be made. Of course, such determinations
are made as a matter of everyday living. This can hardly be the basis of sound public
policy, which should be based on scientific considerations, not feelings and
sub*ective estimations of the sort made in everyday life.
. Gordon, supra note 2, at 1770.
140 Id.
141 See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
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demanded in the transaction." 4 2 The second error in Gordon's third
critique relates to her claim that the "buyer in an ordinary transaction
is benefited." This is necessarily true in the ex ante sense only, not in
the ex post sense. That is, the buyer must always anticipate that
something about the purchase is worth more than the cost, but this
need not be true from the historical perspective. While we usually
are happy with the purchases we make, afterward, the existence of
department store refunds is dramatic testimony to the fact that this is
not always the case. But no less is true with blackmail. The
blackmailee is, by definition, satisfied with his commercial interaction
in the ex ante sense, and usually, but not always, in the ex post.
1. Intent to Harm
In her analysis, Gordon offers a somewhat peculiar definition of
"exploitative"; 4' according to her, the term means "getting something
for nothing."'14 Gordon claims that "most person's sense of self
respect" 45 would prevent them acting in such an improper manner
and would require some degree of reciprocity in the bulk of their
transactions."'' 46 This assertion is untrue. Israel M. Kirzner has
carefully and exhaustively studied entrepreneurship.' 47 According to
Kirzner, the essence of entrepreneurship is precisely the ability to get
something for nothing. 48 Moreover, people often wait in long lines
142

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1770.
id.
Id. at 1771.
Id.

143 See
1
145
146

Id.

147See generally ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(1973)
[hereinafter KIRZNER, COMPETITION]; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE
CAPITALIST PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY, CAPITALISM AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1989); ISRAEL M. KiRZNER, THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW: AN
ESSAY IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1975); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET
THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1963); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNrIY
AND PROFIT (1979). It is no exaggeration to say that, for Kirzner, the very essence of
entrepreneurship is to "get something for nothing." The entrepreneurial act is, in

effect, to seize a ten-dollar bill out of thin air (by noting unmet consumer needs and
acting to satisfy them).
148 See KIRZNER, COMPETITION, supra note 147, at 48. Kirzner
states:
The pure entrepreneur ...

proceeds by his alertness to discover and

exploit situations in which he is able to sell for high prices that which
he can buy for low prices. Pure entrepreneurial profit is the difference
between the two sets of prices. It is not yielded by exchanging
something the entrepreneur values less for something he values more
highly. It comes from discovering sellers and buyers of something for
which the latter will pay more than the former demand. The discovery
of a profit opportunity means the discovery of something obtainable for
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at the opening of a new bank branch for a free toaster or at the
establishment of a new restaurant in order to obtain a free hot dog.
There is no reason why this is any "less desirable ... than engaging in
commercial activity that involves exchange." 49 And even if it were
indeed "less desirable," why should this be an issue on which the law
should cast its baleful eye?
In essence, Gordon sees extraction without reciprocity as
exploitation, which is "less attractive" than an exchange. 50 Blackmail,
however, is a mutual exchange, not an extraction, as Gordon
characterizes it. Blackmail is a mutually agreeable contract according
to which one party agrees to refrain from disclosing information and
the second party agrees to compensate the first party for that
silence. '-'

2. Harm and Benefit
Gordon rejects the notion that "a benefit . . . can be defined

as... the return of something that the other party stole only a
moment before.' 52 Even this is not strictly true, because if someone
steals something from you, surely you would prefer that he gives it
right back, rather than keep it. The former is bound to be more
beneficial than the latter. Here, Gordon is correctly focusing on
initial property rights; if an item is stolen and then returned, the
owner is hardly better off if both occur than if neither did. Gordon's
adherence to property rights analysis, however, is only superficial.
Instead of looking at just ownership, Gordon offers three conditions
that must be satisfied in order to determine that harm has occurred.
These conditions are:
(1) the thing the seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such
that the buyer would be better off . . . if the seller and his

resources did not exist, (2) the buyer/victim would be better off if
the transaction were impossible ... and, (3) the buyer/victim has

done nothing to the other party that would give that party a
corrective justice right against her.
Indubitably, there are cases in which I would be better off if you
did not exist, and thus your very existence is "harmful" to me, such as
nothing at alL No investment at all is required; the free ten-dollar bill is
discovered to be already within one's grasp.
Id. (emphasis added).
'49
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1771.
'50

See id.

:52

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

52 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1771.
153

See id. at 1772.
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when two people have offered competing marriage suits for the same
individual. Yes, you have harmed me by your very existence as a
competitor of mine; I would be better off if you simply disappeared
(an issue that should be irrelevant to law), but you have hardly
violated my rights (which should be the entire focus of the legal
system).
Gordon, as an illustration of the second criteria, considers a
situation in which a plaintiff sues a defendant for damages created by
a falling tree.154 The author concludes that "[t]he landowner would
be worse off if settling lawsuits were impossible.' 5 5 While this seems
reasonable over the long term, it is an empirical question. If the
landowner is an old man who has no interest in what occurs to society
after he dies, and the lawsuit will take away all of his money, and he is
not likely to be a plaintiff in the future in any case, he may reasonably
prefer a situation in which lawsuits are impossible.
On the basis of this idiosyncratic analysis, Gordon declares that

"the injured passerby is not harming the landowner if he extracts
money in settlement or suit.' 56 This assumption, however, appears
rather counterintuitive because the sole function of the landowner's
lawyer is to help the landowner to avoid making any payment if at all
possible. Why would he want to do that if the suit were not deemed
harmful to his client? Here, Gordon is again conflating harm and
rights violation. Whether the victim has done anything wrong to the
victimizer is totally irrelevant. If I beat you out in my marriage
proposal to the woman we both love, you are the victim, and I, the
victimizer. You may never have violated any of my rights beforehand,
such that I have a "corrective justice right" against you. Nevertheless,
I am entirely within my rights to press my marriage suit, even if it
greatly vexes you. Gordon similarly refuses to examine the property
rights in question when she states:
[I]t does not matter whose resources the information is ....
[E]ven if, as libertarians contend, the blackmailer "owns" the
information, it is clear that the purchaser/victim is worse off in a
world where the blackmailer and that resource exist. The
blackmailer is therefore
using that information in a way that
57
harms the victim.1
See id. at 1772 n.140.
Id.
MId.
157
Id. at 1773. Only three possibilities exist regarding the rightful ownership of
this information: either the blackmailer, the blackmailee, or third parties, such as a
husband who would be interested in learning of his wife's infidelity. Lindgren claims
that the information belongs to third parties, despite the fact that they did nothing
14

155
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In some sense, the blackmailer does harm the blackmailee
because the latter would vastly prefer that the former had never come
upon his secret. Mere harm, however, should not be actionable,
otherwise no competition of any sort could exist, whether in
commerce, sports, or anything else.
Secondly, if the blackmailee is "harmed" by the blackmailer, he
would be harmed to a far greater degree if, instead of the blackmailer
unearthing his secret, it is revealed by the gossip. At least the former
will allow the "victim" to buy his way out of his quandary-the latter
Surely, then, if Gordon is willing to imprison the
will not.
blackmailer, she must favor punishing the gossip far more seriously.
Curiously, she entirely avoids the case of the gossip.
But worse; if for Gordon it does not really matter who properly
owns the secret information, then all talk of "chips"'" is then just so
much obfuscation; and so too vanishes any pretense of deontology.
Contrary to her claims, Gordon's, then, is a theory of blackmail that
rests entirely on utilitarian considerations. Matters of right and
wrong simply do not enter into the picture.
V.

CRIMINALIZATION

Having established, at least to her own satisfaction, that central
case blackmail is harmful, unjustified, purposeful, wrongful, and
immoral, Gordon then considers whether it should be criminalized. 59
This conclusion would appear to follow, in her opinion, from the
"liberal view,"160 at least as adumbrated byJohn Stuart Mill"6' and Joel

to earn this information. See generally Lindgren, Paradox,supra note 17. In Jeffrie G.
Murphy's view, this knowledge properly belongs to the blackmailee. See generally
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A PreliminaryInquiry, 63 MONIST 156 (1980). If this were
true, gossip would be illegal because the gossipper, in effect, would be stealing this
information from its rightful owner, the gossippee. No one, however, has followed
this claim to its logical conclusion, which would call for the abolition of the right to
free speech, as it involves gossip.
1
Gordon, supra note 2, at 1777.
159 Id. at 1775.
14WId. Gordon explains the "liberal view" as holding "that only the presence of
harm toward others justifies criminal prohibition." See id. This, however, is
nonsense. One baseball team can "harm" another by winning a game, but the
members of the winning team should not be incarcerated for their actions. A far
better way to characterize this view would be to consider the libertarian approach, in
which only the violation of personal or property rights justifies criminal prohibition.
Blackmail "harms" the blackmailee compared to the situation in which the potential
blackmailer merely remains silent; blackmail, however, does not harm the
blackmailee compared to the situation in which the gossip has unearthed the secret.
All of this is irrelevant to the libertarian because blackmail does not violate any right
possessed by the blackmailee.
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Feinberg. 162 In the author's analysis, however, the issue of whether
gossips ought to be jailed never arises. Also, Gordon fails to reckon
with the fact that drugs, cigarettes, gambling, alcohol, pornography,
prostitution, and other such victimless acts would also seem to fit the
"liberal" case for prohibition. Instead of addressing the criminality of
these activities, Gordon veers off into an economic discussion of
blackmail.
A. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior and Perceptions:
CharacterFormation
Gordon claims that "blackmail prohibition . . . may encourage
character-formation
that discourages bad acts."1 63
This is

counterintuitive because criminalizing blackmail discourages
blackmailers.
Gordon concedes as much when she states that
"criminalizing blackmail has an obvious goal of discouraging
potential blackmailers from undertaking blackmail."'"
The
blackmailer, though, with his ferret-like behavior, tends to strike
terror into the man contemplating an immoral act. The blackmailer
is, in effect, a police officer who is highly motivated and skillful
because he is private.'65 Reducing the blackmailer's scope will increase
such acts as cheating and philandering, at least if it is assumed that

161 See generaly JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
(Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1988)
(1859). This essay argues for liberty on utilitarian grounds; liberty is a good because
it leads to the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.
According to Mills, however, "[i]f all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and
only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified
in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind." Id. at 16.
162 See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1775
& n.151 (citing MILL, supra note 161, at 9192); FEINBERG, supra note 40. Joel Feinberg, in articulating the different viewpoints
as to the moral limits of criminal law, defined the "Harm Principle" as follows: "[i]t
is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be effective in
preventing . . . harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from
acting), and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to

other values." JOEL

FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONG-DOING:

THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE

xix (1988) (emphasis added). Feinberg then defined the "Offense
Principle" as follows: "It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal
prohibition that it is necessary to prevent serious offense to persons other than the
actor and would be an effective means to that end if enacted." Id. Finally, Feinberg
defined the "Liberal Position" as follows: "[T]he harm and offense principles, duly
clarified and qualified, between them exhaust the class of good reasons for criminal
prohibitions." Id.
0 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1776 n.154.
CRIMINAL LAw

164
165

Id.

See generaUy WOOLRIDGE, supra note 10.
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the greater the likelihood of being caught, the less likely a person is
to engage in the act in the first place.
In contrast, Gordon's musings focus mainly on the notion that
legalization "might not only increase the threat related use of
information already possessed, but might also increase the
expenditures made on acquiring new information.""' Even if this is
true, it is an empirical issue and would result in only the increasing
exposure of a decreasingnumber of bad acts. Whether the incidence
of blackmail ultimately would be greater or less is difficult to say, but
Gordon's original claim

that "blackmail prohibition

.

.

.

may

encourage character-formation that discourages bad acts" is clearly
unproven.
B. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior and Perceptions:
Counterleverage
Gordon claims that blackmail prohibition gives "victims"
counterleverage in that "by threatening to go to the authorities if and
only if disclosure is made, victims can discourage blackmailers from
disclosing the contested information.", 67 This assumption has several

problems. For one, Gordon has not yet succeeded in showing that
blackmail is legally horrendous. Because she leaves gossip unscathed,
there is no justification for her efforts to condemn the blackmailer.
Second, the information in question is not "contested."
Rather,
''
Gordon is on record as giving up on this "contest. I
For argument's sake, assume that Gordon's argument is a
worthwhile undertaking-that for some reason, the blackmailee must
be protected from disclosure by law. Gordon thinks that the only way
to accomplish this is to make blackmail illegal. This, however, is not
so because the same goal can be obtained through legalization.
Under a legalization scheme, the blackmailee would pay the
blackmailer to keep his silence. If the blackmailer takes the payment
and still threatens exposure, the blackmailee would then be able to
avail himself of the courts, not for blackmail, but for contract
violation. That is, while blackmail would be legal, it certainly would
not be within the purview of the law to agree to this contract (silence
for money) and then to turn around and break it (having taken the
money, refuse to keep silent as so stipulated).
1
167

Gordon, supra note 2, at 1776.

Id. at 1777.

IM See id. at 1773 ("[I]t does not matter whose resources the information is ...
even if, as libertarians contend, the blackmailer 'owns' the information.").
169
Under Gordon's legal dispensation, the blackmailee would not have to
make
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Additionally, counterleverage, whether of the sort that our
author favors or of the sort created by blackmail legalization, is itself
blackmail Gordon devotes an entire law review article to the
iniquities and impropriety of blackmail and then champions a version
of it herself. Gordon is not without a reply to this charge as she
states:
Unlike the blackmailer, who uses the threat of disclosure to force
the victim to give up something ...to which the blackmailer has

no right, the victim engaging in counter blackmail is using her
threat to enforce her rights-to force the blackmailer to cease his
wrongful behavior towards her. Since this is the victim's "own
chip," and the use of the chip as leverage is neither
"unproductive" nor an "unjustified harming," the victim should
170
be permitted to make this counter threat.
This rationalization, however, is insufficient; blackmail is
blackmail, whether for purposes of which Gordon approves or not. If
the motivation of the blackmailer is at issue, one can concoct many
cases in which the blackmailer acts for what Gordon might consider
"good purposes." For example, consider a situation in which an
individual refuses to repay a significant debt because the debt holder
has no proof that any money is owed. The debt holder cannot
proceed with a legal action, so instead he blackmails the recalcitrant
debtor for the exact amount of money owed.
Another difficulty is that Gordon takes inconsistent positions
within her article. At one point, she states that "it does not matter
whose resources the information is. . . . [E]ven if, as libertarians
contend, the blackmailer 'owns' the information."' 7' Later, Gordon
claims that who owns the information matters very much; in her view,
the counter blackmailer owns the information. 72 Gordon's second
position is correct in at least one point; all blackmailers, "counter"
ones along with all the rest, own the information they use. Gordon
has yet to show this does not apply in all cases.

the initial payment, but under that posited in this Article, he would be required to do
so. In both cases, however, the blackmailee would then be safe from further
demands for money. Thus, under the libertarian system, the blackmailer could
legally obtain whatever funds he could bargain for, while under the present
prohibition, he could not. The justification for making the blackmailer richer, and
the blackmailee poorer, is that the former is the legitimate owner of the information
that he employs to his own ends. Because Gordon explicitly refuses to challenge this
claim, she should not question a logical implication made from it.
:70 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1777.
'71 Id. at 1773.
172 See id.
at 1777.
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C. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior and Perceptions:
Anger
Gordon defends blackmail prohibitionism on the ground that it
will stiffen the spines of blackmailees and make them more resistant
to the threats of blackmailers. The author explains that "[i]f one
assumes that acts of blackmail impose net costs on society, then the
socially beneficial response to a blackmailer is to resist in order to
convince potential blackmailers that blackmail never succeeds, and
thus to silence their threats.' 7 3 However, if one really wants to
promote resistance, and is a utilitarian (for example, unconcerned
with the niceties of justice), then one can go further. Why not make
it illegal to pay blackmail?
True, this, according to Gordon's
perspective, would victimize the blackmailee a second time-once by
the blackmailer and then by the government-but it would promote
resistance.
Another difficulty is that acts of kidnapping certainly "impose
net costs on society." If people never paid off kidnappers, and this
were known for sure, this behavior would cease forthwith. Thus,
according to Gordon's brand of utilitarianism, the state should
imprison not only kidnappers, but also all those who cooperate with
them by paying
them off. This, it would appear, is the "honorable"
74
thing to do.

Of course, libertarian law would give short shrift to such
suggestions. It is the kidnapper who violates rights, not the family
member of the kidnappee who merely wants the safe return of his
loved one, and is willing to pay for it. Nor is the blackmailee who
pays for silence guilty of any rights violation. Nor, for that matter, is
the blackmailer.
Gordon asserts that "[s] ometimes we legislate against something
in order to keep our sense of outrage alive." 7 5 As a report of
legislative activities, this is unexceptionable; surely laws against drugs,
pornography, and prostitution are instances of this tendency.
Gordon, however, is not merely reporting on this phenomenon, but
is instead supporting it, at least in the case of blackmail. But if for
blackmail, why not for these other activities?

173

174
175

I& at 1780.
See id. at 1779.
Id. at 1780.
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CONCLUSION

To sum up this critique of Gordon's argument for the
prohibition of blackmail, central case blackmail is but a special case
of this activity. Gordon's analysis, even if correct, would only reach
this special case; all other forms of blackmail would still be justified.
Gordon, however, has not succeeded even in this small area. The
simple facts that the blackmailer derives no additional value from
exposing the secret of the blackmailee and that his only motivation is
pecuniary do not demonstrate that he is not the rightful owner of the
informational "chip" of which Gordon speaks. Neither do these facts
indicate that the blackmailer has invaded the person or property of
the blackmailee. These assertions by Gordon cannot be maintained
when compared to the actions of the gossip, whom Gordon never
mentions in her analysis.

